KGB network in Labor Party

[KGB]

I have written this book in consultation with Vasilij Mitrokhin, based on the extensive top secret material (described in Chapter 1) which he has smuggled out from the KGB foreign intelligence archive. For the past quarter of a century, Mitrokhin has passionately wanted this material, which for twelve years he risked his life to assemble, to see the light of day. He wished to reveal “how thin the thread of peace actually was during the Cold War.” From that passion this book has been born. I have felt it my duty to ensure that this material, which offers detailed and often unique insights into the workings of the Soviet State and the history of the Soviet Union, achieves the level of public awareness and recognition that it deserves.

Like all archives,those of the KGB require interpretation in the light of obvious research and related documents. The end notes and bibliography provide full details of the additional sources used to place Mitrokhin’s revelations in historical context.
These sources also provide overwhelming corroborative evidence for his genuineness as a source.
Codenames (also known as “worknames” in the case of KGB officers) appear in the text in capitals. Many KGB codenames were used more than once. In such cases, the text and index make clear which individual is referred to. It is also important to note that, although certain individuals were targeted by the KGB, and may have been given codenames, this does not mean that the persons named were conscious or witting agents or sources-or even that they were aware that they were being targeted for recruitment or political influence operations. Similarly, the fact that an individual
may have endorsed a position that was favorable to the Soviet Union does not necessarily mean that this person was working as an agent, or agent of influence, for the KGB. The KGB frequently gave prominent policymakers codenames in order to protect the identity of their targets, and to order recruited KGB agents to target such individuals.
For legal reasons, some of the Soviet agents identified in KGB files can be referred to in this book only by their codenames. In a limited number of cases, chiefly because of the risk of prejudicing a possible prosecution, no reference can be made to them at
all. These omissions do not, so far as I am aware, significantly affect the main conclusions of any chapter.

The KGB’s main fear in the after mathof the show trials of Orlov, Ginzburg and Shcharansky was that Orlov, like Sakharov three years earlier, would be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. The KGB residency in Norway was ordered to give the highest priority to an active measures campaign, personally overseen by Andropov himself, designed to discredit Orlov and ensure that his candidacy failed. 29 On October 27,1978 the Oslo resident, Leonid Alekseyevich Makarov (code-named SEDOV), rang Suslov, the Politburo’s leading ideologist, in the middle of the night to pass on the good news that the prize had gone instead to the Egyptian and Israeli leaders Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin.

Makarov succeeded in claiming more of the credit than he deserved for what was regarded by the
KGB as a famous victory. In a notably immodest telegram to the Centre, he reported that the residency had successfully “carried out complex active measures through reliable assets in order to disrupt the anti-Soviet operation” to award the prize to Orlov. It claimed to have brought pressure to bear during conversations with a series of Norwegian political leaders, chief among them Knut Frydenlund, the foreign minister, Reiulf Steen, chairman of the Norwegian Labor Party and of the Parliamentary Foreign Policy Committee, Tor Halvorsen, chairman of the Central Federation of Trade Union sand of the Board of the Norway-USSR Friendship Society, and Trygve Bratteli, a former prime minister and chairman of the Parliamentary Labor Party Group: In the course of these conversations, the provocative nature and anti-Soviet bias of the agitation around Yuri Orlov was emphasized.
. .
It was pointed out that the political leadership of Norway needed to show proper responsibility for the state and development of bilateral relations between our countries. The THE WORDNDHEHIELD
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conversations produced the desired response in influential circles of the Norwegian Labor Party. The work that we did exerted useful influence on the foreign policy leadership of Norway and, in our opinion, made it possible for theresidency’s task to be carried out-to prevent the award of the Nobel PeacePrize to Yuri Orlov and his Committee.~’The Centre gave Makarov as much credit as he gave himself. Viktor Fedorovich Grushko, head of the
FCD Third Department (whose responsibilities included Scandinavia), telegraphed congratulations on “the determination and operational effectiveness which the residency has shown while carrying out this ANDROPOV REMAINED AS obsessed with ideological subversion during his final years as KGB chairman as he had been at the outset. The war against subversion extended even to abstract painting.

A joint report in 1979 by the KGB Moscow Directorate and the Moscow department of the Fifth Directorate proudly reported that, over the past two years, “it proved possible to use agents to prevent seven attempts by avant-garde artists to make provocative arrangements to show their pictures. ”Four“ leaders of the avant-garde artists” had been recruited as agents. Surveil-lance of the “creative intelligentsia’’ was an important part of “the task of the
[KGB] agencies to protect the intelligentsia from the influence of bourgeois ideology”: Creative workers (agents) produce individualistic works; they are cut off from the positive influence of the collective for forming and training their personality; they develop an egocentric attitude towards reality, one that is based on strictly personal perceptions, personal interest, arrogance, ambition and overestimation of their importance. Andropov told a Fifth Directorate on ference in March 1979 that the GB could not afford to ignore the activities of a single dissident, however obscure:

Our enemies and even certain comrades from Communist Parties in Western countries often bring up this question: “If, as you say, you have constructed a developed socialist society, then do various anti-social phenomena or the negative activities of an insignificant handful of people really represent a threat to it? Are they really capable of shaking the foundations of socialism?

”Of course not, we reply, if one takes each act or politically harmful trick individually. But if one takes them all together, combining their content with their purpose as regards ideological sabotage, then every such act represents a danger. And we cannot ignore it. We simply do not have the right to permit even the smallest mis-calculation here, for in the political sphere any kind of ideological sabotage is directly or indirectly intended to create an opposition which is hostile to our system-to create an underground, to encourage a transition to terrorism and other extreme forms of struggle, and, in he final analysis, to create the conditions for the overthrow of socialism.

Here you can observe members of the norwegian parlament, who was engaded in CCCP-stalin vasalstate.
Remark, serveral of those members have no comments visible and others are. The russian agents ones is not visible, or you may have access if they permits your request-. Gro H Brundtlands notes are not visible, before next year.

[Cloneblogg]

(Dagbladet): På 60-tallet var lønns- og prisminister Gunnar Bøe (Ap) i Einar Gerhardsens regjering mistenkt for å være KGB-agent. Fhv stm Einar Gerhardsen hadde selv kodenavnet "JAN" hos KGB, og var en svært sikker Agent for KGB.

Men etterforskeren Ørnulf Tofte, mannen som arresterte Arne Treholt, fikk aldri nok på Gunnar Bøe til at det ble tatt ut tiltale.

- Solgte informasjon
Nå har Dagbladet som første norske avis fått tak i nye og hittil ukjente dokumenter fra tidligere KGB-arkivar Vasilij Mitrokhin.

Les også: Smuglet arkivet ut i skoene.

Ifølge Mitrokhins arkivnotater skal statsråd Bøe, under dekknavnet «Mono» ha solgt Nato-dokumenter til KGB i perioden 1960 til 1963, både i originalform, skriftlig og muntlig form. Gunnar Bøe skal ha fått mellom fem og femten tusen per overlevering, til sammen 110 000 kroner over treårsperioden (1,2 millioner i 2013-kroner, red.anm.).

Kontakten med KGB skal ha skjedd på statsrådens kontor, i hans leilighet, på transport på vei fra jobb, utenbys, på offisielle mottakelser og i den sovjetiske ambassaden. Bøes motiv for å selge informasjon skal ha vært en økonomisk krise etter et famøst kjøp av en gammel skipsredervilla til bruk for et russisk statsbesøk i Norge. Da Bøe gikk ut av regjering, ble han ifølge dokumentene satt «på vent» av KGB, før kontakten skal ha blitt gjenopptatt i 1971-1972.

FBI har uttalt at Mitrokhin-arkivet er «den mest komplette og omfattende etterretning som noensinne er mottatt fra en kilde». Den tidligere britiske utenriksministeren Jack Straw har kalt arkivet avgjørende for å avsløre spioner og avdekke etterretningstrusler.

Dette står i Mitrokhins notater om Gunnar Bøe:

« «Mono», Gunnar Bøe, f. 1917, fra Bergen.
Før 1951 pleiet en KGB-ansatt kontakt med «Mono» i Oslo. Senere begynte han å unnvike halvoffisielle møter på grunn av frykt for å ødelegge karrieren. I slutten av 1959 ble det kjent for residenturet (KGB-kontoret, red. anm). at «Mono» var i pengetrøbbel på grunn av oppkjøp av en villa og en tomt. Gjennom å bruke disse omstendighetene, ble han vervet av en medarbeider ved Oslo-residensen, Je.S.Tsjervjakov, i 1960. Grunnlaget for vervingen var materiell og ideologisk nærhet.
Han lovte å gi informasjon om Nato mot materiell hjelp.

På den tiden var han pris- og lønnsminister i regjeringen, og hadde tilgang til dokumenter. Han ga materialer i original, skriftlig og i tillegg muntlig form, som han snakket inn på bånd. Han informerte om amerikanernes dekryptering av lukkede samband mellom sovjetiske hærenheter i Sovjetunionen nordlige regioner, hvilket ble bekreftet gjennom KGBs etterforskning. Belønning for informasjonen var fra 5000 til 15000 kr. Fra februar 1960 til februar 1963 mottok han mer enn 110 000 norske kroner.

Kontakten med ham skjedde på hans kontor, i agentens leilighet, på transport på vei hjem fra jobb, utenbys, på offisielle mottakelser og i den sovjetiske ambassaden. Fra september 1960 til november 1963 var «Mono» i kontakt med KGB-ansatt A.N. Slavjagin. I 1962 gikk «Mono» av etter å ha tatt dissens i regjeringen på spørsmålet om Norge skulle ta opp medlemsforhandlinger med Fellesmarkedet. (...) «Mono» blir ført over i konserveringsregime.» (Satt på vent, red.anm.)

Flere av Mitrokhins opplysninger stemmer med detaljer som er kjent fra før. Årstallene og detaljene rundt Bøes inntreden og uttreden av regjeringen er korrekt gjengitt. Opplysningen om at statsråden kjøpte en villa som ga han pengetrøbbel, er korrekt. Det at Bøe skal ha blitt tilbudt penger til huskjøpet i bytte mot Nato-dokumenter, stemmer med den mistanken politiet hadde. Det samme gjør navnet på den angivelige vervingsagenten.